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This article analyses the impact of public investment on private
investment. Apart from purely ideological aspects, two opposing
interpretations may be distinguished with regard to the relation-
ship between these variables. The first is that there is competition
between public and private investment, so that the former
“crowds out” the latter. The second is that public investment is
complementary to private investment in so far that, by generating
positive externalities, it creates favourable conditions for the
latter. In view of the relative scarcity of empirical studies on this
matter, this study deals with the case of the Brazilian economy
in the period from 1947 to 1990. Its main conclusions are that
private investment is indeed crowded out by public investment
in the short term, but in the long term the cointegration vector
coefficients indicate that these two variables complement each
other.
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I
Introduction
Many economists maintain that reducing the size of
the State would be a good  thing for  society as  a
whole, since they consider that public investment is
less efficient than private investment. They also as-
sert that the State should not compete with the private
sector for the use of productive resources. In view of
the scarcity of physical and financial resources, they
say, if the government appropriates these resources
this would, at least in the short term, have a negative
effect on private investment. Furthermore, public in-
tervention can raise prices and interest rates in the
economy, thus reducing the private sector’s disposi-
tion to invest (Buiter, 1977; Sundararajan and Thakur,
1980; Ram, 1986). The crowding-out of private in-
vestment is shown in the IS-LM model.1 It should be
noted that because it limits itself to short-term im-
pacts, this model omits the long-term effects (Buiter,
1977 and 1980).
However, there are also those who maintain that
public investment can have a complementary effect
(crowding-in) with respect to private investment, es-
pecially when it is made in the areas of infrastructure
and the provision of public goods. Barro (1990) shows
that public investment has a strong impact on the
marginal productivity of private capital and labour.
Another argument in favour of public investment
is that the State is more willing to make higher-risk
investments than the private sector. In the developing
economies, sectors which require large volumes of
initial capital and long lead times are considered to be
of high risk (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). It would be
hard for the private sector to make such investments,
not only because of the risk but also because of the
limited  size of the  secondary securities market. It
would be difficult for the incipient financial sector of
those countries to finance long-term projects that re-
quire a large volume of resources.
Through its investment, the government can act
in an anti-cyclical manner to reduce fluctuations in
aggregate demand and uncertainty in the economy.
Another effect which is noted in the economic litera-
ture is that the government increases the aggregate
demand of the economy by creating a market for
goods produced by the private sector. By increasing
aggregate demand, public investment can have a
positive impact on society’s expectations with regard
to the behaviour of that variable. An increase in those
expectations will lead to a rise in private investment.
Thus, the government investment would have two
positive impacts: firstly, it would generate demand
for the private sector, and secondly, it would raise
future expectations with regard to aggregate demand,
giving rise to an increase in private investment
(Sundararajan and Thakur, 1980).
In the economic literature, four methodologies
are identified for  approaching the question of
crowding-out versus crowding-in: computable gen-
eral equilibrium models, IS-LM model estimates,
models of the impact on the supply side, and esti-
mates of the investment function. The appendix to
this article gives a summary of the published studies
using these methodologies.
Computable general equilibrium models not only
make it possible to estimate the effect of public in-
vestment on private investment but also permit the
study of its effect on the other macroeconomic vari-
ables and income distribution. This methodology also
makes it possible to estimate the result of the impact
of public investment on private investment on the
basis of various sources  of financing, such as in-
creased taxes, money issue, an increase in the public
debt, etc. Pardahan, Ratha and Sarma (1990) use this
working methodology, but note that the computable
general equilibrium model leaves out possible long-
term impacts.
Another interesting methodology in the literature
on  this subject is the estimation of an IS-LM type
model: the studies using this methodology suffer,
however, from the fact that they use econometric
techniques which can give rise to skewed results.
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 The authors wish to thank Carlos Henrique Rocha, Bernardo
Mueller, Adolfo Sachsida and Tancredo Almada Cruz for their
valuable observations in the course of this study, and the Na-
tional Research Council for its support. The views expressed in
this article are of course entirely the responsibility of the authors.
1 There are two types of effects: direct crowding-out, which is
the reduction of the physical resources available to the private
sector, and indirect crowding-out, which takes place through the
increase in interest rates and prices. See Buiter, 1977 and 1980.
The so-called supply-side impact estimates the
effect of public investment on total factor productiv-
ity. One of the first studies in this area was that of
Ram (1986), followed by Aschauer (1989). It may be
noted that Barro (1990) has developed a model in
line with the “new growth theory”, thus consolidating
this line of research which has given rise to a number
of empirical studies.
Finally, the impact of public investment on pri-
vate investment can be estimated on the basis of in-
vestment theories. In the present article it was
decided to estimate the investment function, for
which purpose an attempt has been made to compare
Jorgenson’s neoclassical theory with the theory of ir-
reversible investment in conditions of uncertainty. It
may be noted that there are few empirical studies
which seek to identify a relation between irreversible
investment in conditions of uncertainty and the im-
pact of public investment on private investment.
More specifically, the present article seeks to es-
timate the behaviour of private investment as a func-
tion of the aggregate product, of the interest rate and
of public investment for the Brazilian economy in the
period 1947-1990. It analyses not only the short-term
impacts but also the long-term ones, estimating an
autoregressive model with distributive lags (ADL).
The long-term equilibrium for this type of estimate
gives the static solution. The results indicate that in
the short term (error correction model) there is substi-
tution between public and private investment,
whereas in the long term the relation expressed in the
cointegration vector indicates that the impact of pub-
lic investment on private investment is positive.
The article is divided into four sections. After the
introduction (section I), the empirical formulation
and the theoretical bases used are described in section
II, the econometric results are presented in section
III, and section IV contains the conclusions.
II
Theoretical structure
First of all, a brief review will be made of the eco-
nomic theory on investment, after which the empiri-
cal formulation used in this article will be set forth.
Jorgenson (1963) developed a model in the neoclassi-
cal tradition in which enterprises seeking to maxi-
mize their gains equate the marginal productivity of
capital with its utilization cost. Adding together the
capital needs of each enterprise, this gives the total
amount of capital desired by society. A theoretical
framework with microeconomic bases is thus con-
structed for determining the desired capital. In this
context, an enterprise has optimum accumulation
when the marginal productivity of its capital equals
its utilization cost. The notion of the utilization cost
of the capital comes from the idea that most of the
capital belongs to the enterprise, which therefore
does not pay rent for using it. However, the use of
this capital nevertheless has a cost for the enterprise,
measured by the opportunity cost of maintaining it.
The depreciation and variation in the value of the
capital goods belonging to the enterprise must be in-
cluded as part of the utilization cost. This cost will
determine the optimum accumulation of capital. The
interest rate plus the variation in the value of the
capital  stock  (variations  in  price and depreciation)
must be equal  to the  marginal contribution of  the
capital to the enterprise. This is the main conclusion
of Jorgenson’s model. It assumes the existence of
adjustment costs, so that current investment would
not be immediately in line with the desired level. It
generally postulates a symmetrical adjustment cost,
that is to say, the enterprise would incur the same
costs for investing and disinvesting.
Among the components which determine invest-
ment, there are two components, namely expectations
and the uncertainty of the economy, which are not
incorporated in Jorgenson’s formulation. Moreover,
the assumption of symmetrical adjustment costs
would appear to have little empirical backing, since
disinvestment is seen to have a higher cost for an
enterprise than investment. The notion of irre-
versibility arises from such criticisms. Once an enter-
prise has made an investment, that capital is not
reversible without major difficulties.
The reasons for  this  are as follows:  i) poorly
developed secondary markets for capital goods; ii)
adverse selection in the quality of capital goods, and
iii) specific types of capital for specific enterprises.
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As the secondary market for capital goods is lim-
ited, especially in the developing countries, the enter-
prise will have to bear heavy costs if it wishes to
disinvest the capital it possesses.
Adverse selection is connected with the question
known in the literature as the “lemons problem”.2 As
the owner of the capital good has more information
on it than the possible buyer and there are capital
goods of different qualities, the cost of disinvestment
for the enterprise will also be high. Moreover, as the
market price is determined by the average quality of
goods, suppliers of capital would be reluctant to offer
a good of higher quality than the average.  Thus,
when selling a capital good on the secondary market
an enterprise could incur heavy costs.
With regard to specific capital, it is assumed that
the enterprise uses capital goods specifically adapted
to its production line. If it wishes to dispose of such
goods, the purchasers will have to make modifica-
tions in order to adapt the equipment to another type
of production line. A common example in the litera-
ture is that  of the iron and steel industry. Conse-
quently, the assumption of asymmetrical adjustment
costs would appear to be the most appropriate for
modelling private investment (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994; Pindyck, 1993).
Thus, if we assume the extreme case of an irre-
versible investment in conditions of uncertainty, it is
reasonable that enterprises will become more cau-
tious when making investments, even in a favourable
environment, because in an adverse future they could
find themselves with an excess of capital which they
cannot reduce. Ultimately, the enterprise must in-
clude in its strategic planning the possibility of post-
poning investment in the present period in order to
make it in a later period. This analytical methodology
explains why, even in a favourable economic envi-
ronment, some enterprises prefer not to invest. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) cite the case of the drop in inter-
est rates in the United States in 1991 and 1992 as a
good example of this situation. In spite of that drop,
there was practically no change in the level of invest-
ment. These authors suggest that the drop in interest
rates also meant a reduction in the opportunity cost of
postponing the investment and awaiting more favour-
able economic conditions. They also maintain that
the liquid effect (of a reduction in interest rates) is
weak and often ambiguous.3
The main contribution of the studies by Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) is the notion that if, in conditions
of uncertainty and irreversible investment, there are
possibilities of postponing a project, then this infor-
mation should be incorporated in the calculation of
the investment decision. If this is done, the response
of investment to changes in the economic environ-
ment displays a smoother trajectory, with fewer fluc-
tuations than that based on the traditional theory.4
Thus, the reasons for situations in which the eco-
nomic environment is favourable but the rate of in-
vestment shows little variation are to be found in the
theory of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The example of
the drop in interest rates in the United States appears
to be one of these cases.
In the present study, as in the study by Rocha
and Teixeira (1996),5 private investment is consid-
ered a dependent  variable whose behaviour is ex-
plained by the short-term interest rate, the aggregate
product and public investment. Thus, the functional
formulation used is as follows:
Iprivate = f(Y,r,Ipublic)
The aggregate product, Y, includes the invest-
ment function as the demand expectations of entre-
preneurs. A positive relation between the aggregate
product and private investment is expected. The
nominal interest rate, r, measures the utilization cost
of capital. If it has a negative coefficient, this pro-
vides empirical evidence in favour of the neoclassical
theory of Jorgenson. Likewise, a very small value for
the interest rate coefficient, or a statistically insignifi-
cant coefficient, would provide empirical evidence in
favour of the theory of irreversible investment in con-
ditions of uncertainty. Public investment can have
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2 The idea of adverse selection was proposed by Akerlof (1970).
That author analysed the used car market in the United States
and showed that imperfect information and automobiles of dubi-
ous quality have a strong effect on used car prices. In that coun-
try, automobiles of dubious quality are known as “lemons”, so
that the problem of adverse selection also came to be known as
the lemons problem.
3 Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 14. These authors also maintain
that the stability of interest rates is more important than their
actual level. If the aim is to stimulate investment, a policy of
eliminating undesirable and unnecessary fluctuations in interest
rates should be pursued.
4 In this respect, see Caballero (1993).
5 The data were obtained from the GDP, the information on pri-
vate and public investment was taken from the historical series
of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), and
the data on investment by State enterprises were provided by the
Getúlio Vargas Foundation. Interest rates were taken from
Ronci, 1991.
either a negative or a positive effect. Depending on
the sign of the coefficient, this determines the impact
of the public sector on private investment. If the co-
efficient is positive it indicates a relation of comple-




The results  of the Dickey-Fuller  test to  determine
whether the series are stationary are given in table 1.6
The first column in this table shows the variables
analysed. The second gives the values of the expanded
Dickey-Fuller test (t-adf), and the third column shows
the number of lags in the first difference. The last two
columns give the values of the observed t statistic for
the coefficients of these lags and the respective levels of
significance (t-prob). The criterion for the selection of
the lags for this test was the level of significance of the
coefficient for each of them, in line with the method-
ology suggested by Doornik and Hendry (1994).
As may be seen, the only statistically significant
lag was that of the GDP with one period of lag, since
t-prob was 0.003. It was therefore necessary to ana-
lyse the expanded Dickey-Fuller test (t-adf), which in
this case did not provide any evidence that the GDP
series was stationary (t-adf = -1.6718 > t-adfcritical =
3.957). For the other variables, the Dickey-Fuller test
without lags is sufficient to reject the hypothesis that
the series are stationary.
The same test was then used to analyse whether
or not the differences in the series whose results are
given in table 2 are stationary or not. These statistical
procedures rejected the hypothesis that the difference
series are not stationary. It is therefore concluded that
GDP, private investment, public investment and the
nominal interest rate are first-order integrals, since
the primary differences are stationary. This procedure
for determining the nature of the integral series is
suggested in Enders (1995).7
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6 The logarithm of the series was used; this transform has advan-
tages because the estimated coefficients  can be interpreted as
elasticities. Various empirical studies have made the same
change, as for example Aschauer (1989), Rocha and Teixeira
(1996)  and  Ferreira (1994). The logarithmic transform of the
data also makes possible greater stability of the variance, which
favours the empirical estimation.
7 Analysis of the autocorrelation of the series by level and differ-
ences was also used, and it was likewise concluded that there
was first-order integration.
TABLE 1
Dickey-Fuller test for the series logarithm a
Variables t-adf Lag t-lag t-prob
Log GDP -1.5330 2 0.9458 0.3504
Log GDP -1.6718 1 3.142 0.0033
Log GDP -2.2860 0 - -
Log private investment -1.1477 2 0.77385 0.4439
Log private investment -1.1070 1 -1.2818 0.2077
Log private investment -1.406 0 - -
Log public investment -1.4655 2 0.6244 0.5362
Log public investment -1.5323 1 0.10748 0.9150
Log public investment -1.5588 0 - -
Log Tx interest 0.41525 2 -1.5847 0.1216
Log Tx interest -0.36457 1 -0.91304 0.3670
Log Tx interest -1.0046 0 - -
a The critical values of the distribution calculated by Mackinnon
(1991), expanded Dickey-Fuller with constant included, are -2.934
at the 5% confidence level and -3.597 at the 1% level.
TABLE 2
Dickey-Fuller test for the first
difference of the series logarithm a
Variables t-adf Lag t-lag t-prob
∆Log GDP -2.1228 2 0.78225 0.4392
∆Log GDP -1.9917 1 -1.1311 0.2653
∆Log GDP -2.9672b 0 - -
∆Log private investment -3.0506c 2 0.36210 0.7193
∆Log private investment 3.3158c 1 -1.0961 0.2799
∆Log private investment -6.3339c 0
∆Log public investment -3.1563c 2 0.36210 0.7193
∆Log public investment -3.4211c 1 -1.0961 0.2799
∆Log public investment -5.6931c 0 - -
∆Log Tx interest -5.8007c 2 2.2279 0.0321
∆Log Tx interest -5.8508c 1 1.3803 0.1756
∆Log Tx interest -7.4870c 0 - -
a The critical values of the distribution calculated by Mackinnon
(1991), expanded Dickey-Fuller with constant included, are -1.949
at the 5% confidence level and -2.621 at the 1% level.
b Significant at the 5% level.
c Significant at the 1% level.
In the present study, it was decided to estimate
an ADL.8 We began with linear regression, using a
more global dynamic specification (lags of three peri-
ods) in order to identify the dynamics of the relation
between the variables. The main conclusions were
that only the one-period lag was significant for the
analysis; the others were statistically insignificant
according to the F test provided by the Pc-Give
econometric programme.
The interest rate proved to be insignificant with
all the lags, which is evidence in favour of the theory
on investment in conditions of uncertainty. This re-
sult is also compatible with those found by Rodrigues
(1988), Ronci (1991) and Studart (1992). In all these
studies, the interest rate has a coefficient with very
low or statistically insignificant value. Rodrigues
(1988) and Studart (1992) maintain that the availabil-
ity of credit would be a more important variable for
private investment in Brazil. The regression with the
best statistical result may be seen in table 3.
The current GDP coefficient is that which showed
the greatest impact on private investment. As was to
be expected, the sign was positive, which indicates
that demand expectations are a relevant variable.
The lagged GDP coefficient was negative. However,
the liquid effect of demand on private investment is
positive.
Lagged private investment had a positive sign,
which  reflects the irreversibility of investment:  in
other words, investment made in the preceding period
has a positive effect on investment in the present pe-
riod.9 It may be noted that this variable was quite
significant, with a Student-T value of 7.6. The idea of
the irreversibility of investment decisions was
strengthened by the trend variable which, although
having a very low coefficient, was nevertheless sig-
nificant at 5%. The value of this coefficient would
also appear to indicate private investment aimed at
covering the depreciation of the capital stock.
Public investment in the current period has a nega-
tive effect on private investment, possibly reflecting
competition for the use of the available resources (sub-
stitution), whereas public investment in the preceding
period has a positive impact on private investment,
which suggests the existence of complementarity.
The static  equilibrium  will determine whether
the series are cointegrated, that is to say, whether
there is a long-term relation between them. The
Pc-Give econometric programme indicates such a
relation on the basis of a steady-state dynamic equi-
librium condition. It gives the value of the coeffi-
cients, as well as a joint test for their significance.
The results of the long-term static solution for the
regression in question are as follows:
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TABLE 3
Best estimate of private investment, 1948-1990 a
(Dependent variable: private investment)
Variables Coefficient Standard deviation t-statistic t-prob
Log private investment (1) b 0.70489 0.092524 7.618 0.0000
Log GDP 2.6629 0.47158 5.647 0.0000
Log GDP (1) b -2.5166 0.48354 -5.205 0.0000
Log public investment -0.38131 0.087515 -4.357 0.0001
Log public investment (1) b 0.45212 0.084599 5.344 0.0000
Trend 0.0069648 0.0033298 2.092 0.0436
a R2 = 0.999818 DW = 2.16 Harvey’s R2 = 0.87870
b (1) indicates that the variable is shifted by one period.
Lagrange multiplier for autocorrelation:            F (2.34) = 0.41762 [0.6619]
ARCH 1 F (1.34) = 0.043591 [0.8359]
Normality χ2 (2) = 4.5611 [0.1022]
White’s heterocedasticity test F (12.23) = 0.75517 [0.6870]
Ramsey’s specification test (RESET) F (1.35) = 1.9639 [0.1699]
The values in parentheses indicate the p-value of the test.
8 In order to use the model with only one equation, it is assumed
that the product and public investment are only weakly exoge-
nous and that there is a cointegration vector.
9 See Gujarati (1995). This author suggests that the dependent
variable, lagged as exogenous in the regression, indicates some
friction in this aggregate.
Log private
investment = + 0.4956 Log GDP
+ 0.2399 Log public investment
+ 0.0236 Trend
Wald test χ2 (3) = 2921.1 [0.0000] 10
The long-term equilibrium solution for the Bra-
zilian economy for the period 1948-1990 indicates
that the GDP has a positive impact on private invest-
ment of the order of 0.5, while public investment has
a positive impact of 0.24 in the long term. In spite of
the negative value of the current public investment
coefficient, when the long-term effect of such invest-
ment is analysed it is noted that the effect is positive.
There are two factors which may explain this fact: the
impact of public investment on GDP may have a
longer lead time, and the complementary effects
(crowding-in) may also have longer lead times. A
typical example would be the construction of a hy-
droelectric station or an iron and steel plant which
takes  several years to  give  results. These  impacts
confirm the long-term analysis made by Sundararajan
and Takhur (1980) for India, where in the short term
government investment has a negative impact on pri-
vate investment, but in the long term public invest-
ment has a positive effect on private sector
investment decisions. It may be noted that this long-
term effect is omitted in the studies on the Brazilian
economy. After noting the cointegration of the vari-
ables, it is necessary to estimate the model once again
in an abbreviated form, that is to say, to adjust the
model for differences, including the lagged error cor-
rection   mechanism. The abbreviated coefficients
showed the  adjustment of  the economy  towards a
long-term trajectory. Consequently, these coefficients
reflect the short-term impact and not the long-term
equilibrium relation (Enders, 1995; Doornik and
Hendry, 1994). The adjustment of the error correction
model gave the results shown in table 4.11
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TABLE 4
Result of applying the error correction model, 1949-1990
Variables Coefficient Standard deviation t-statistic t-prob
A. Without dummy variablea
∆Log GDP 2.7176 0.30047 9.045 0.0000
∆Log public investment -0.38753 0.074176 -5.224 0.0000
ECM (1) b -0.28437 0.061806 -4.601 0.0000
B. With dummy variablec
∆Log GDP 2.7866 0.27501 10.133 0.0000
∆Log public investment -0.42329 0.068706 -6.161 0.0000
i 1954 (dummy variable) -0.25452 0.085380 -2.981 0.0050
ECM (1) b -0.26179 0.056875 -4.603 0.0000
a R2 = 0.702479; DW = 2.19; Harvey’s R2 = 0.85033
Data criteria: SC = -4.61857; HQ = -4.69719
b (1) indicates that the model is de-phased by one period.
c R2 = 0.758869; DW = 1.86; Harvey’s R2 = 0.87870
Data criteria: SC = -4.73972; HQ = -4.84455
Lagrange multiplier for autocorrelation: F (2.36) = 0.4181 [0.6614]
ARCH 1 F (1.36) = 0.70956 [0.4052]
Normality χ2 (2) = 3.1013 [0.2121]
White’s heterocedasticity test F (7.30) = 0.21539 [0.9790]
Ramsey’s specification test (RESET) F (1.37) = 0.20456 [0.6537]
10 Significant at the 1% level. The value between parentheses
indicates the p-value of the test.
11 The unit root tests suggested in Harris (1995) rejected the
hypothesis of non-cointegration, while the estimated value for
the test was -3.43 and the critical value at 10% is -3.4, which
suggests that there is convergence of the model for the long-term
solution. When the ECM coefficient is analysed, the unit root
tests for this variable confirm the cointegration hypothesis. This
fact suggests to us that the economy should converge towards
this equilibrium solution, that is to say, it confirms that the vari-
ables are cointegrated.
In the error correction model, no lag of the
variables was significant except that in the error
correction mechanism (ECM). The estimation of the
ECM with the current differences has the great advan-
tage that these differences are not correlated with the
ECM, in other words, the tests of the significance of
the coefficients can be carried out individually
without losing efficiency. Furthermore, the coeffi-
cients of the current differences represent the
short-term impacts with a good empirical adjust-
ment (Hendry, 1995).
As  was to  be  expected, the coefficient of  the
lagged ECM is negative. This sign of the coefficient
represents the adjustment of the model towards the
long-term equilibrium, with a value of 0.28.
The above result is in accordance with the results
obtained by Rocha and Teixeira (1996); the coeffi-
cient of public investment has a negative impact on
private investment when the error correction model is
adjusted. However, the authors did not analyse the
long-term impacts expressed by the cointegration
vector, so that their conclusion that there is substitu-
tion between public and private investment in Brazil
is only correct for the short term. It should be re-
called that in the long term private investment re-
sponds positively to public investment.
Analysis of the residues standardized by the stand-
ard deviation gave an atypical value for 1954, possibly
reflecting the situation of relative uncertainty that the
Brazilian economy was experiencing during that period.
A dummy variable was included for that year, thus im-
proving the adjustment of the data. The dummy variable
was significant at the 1% confidence level; the informa-
tion criteria of Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn gave
higher values in the module, as did the R2 and also
Harvey’s R2. The normality tests also improved,
while the correlation diagram of the residues points
to the conclusion that the residues are “white noise”.
The results with the inclusion of the dummy
variable (table 4, section B) were as follows: the het-
erocedasticity tests (ARCH and White) did not reject
the null  hypothesis  for the homocedasticity of  the
residues, and neither was evidence found in favour of
the hypothesis of the autocorrelation of the residues,
so that the regression residues would appear to be
“white noise”; this fact indicates good adjustment of
the data, so that the model seems to be well specified,
as reflected in the Ramsey test (RESET).
IV
Conclusions
In short, the results give grounds for concluding that
in the case of Brazil:
i) Demand expectations, represented here by the
GDP, are the main factor in determining private in-
vestment.
ii) The irreversibility of investment decisions
was confirmed by the significance of the lagged pri-
vate investment coefficient.
iii) The theory of investment in conditions of
uncertainty was backed up by the fact that the model
showed the statistical insignificance of the interest
rate coefficient.
iv) Substitution of private investment by public
investment was only noted in the short term.
v) The complementarity between private and pub-
lic investment was brought out by the sign of the coef-
ficient of that variable in the long-term adjustment.
It  would  be  interesting  to  carry out comple-
mentary studies investigating the causal relation
between the variables involved in the model, in or-
der to clarify the possible indirect impacts which
may exist. It would also be important to make a
sectoral disaggregation of public investment in order
to identify the mutual impact of the different sectors
of the economy.
Nevertheless, the present study does make some
useful contributions through its estimation of an in-
vestment function based on the theory of irreversible
investment in conditions of uncertainty and its analy-
sis of the long-term impact, which is omitted by most
empirical studies dealing with Brazil. Private invest-
ment in Brazil does not seem to be very sensitive to
interest rates, but it does react strongly to demand
expectations, represented in this study by the effec-
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tive product and public investment. Other possible
future projects could involve an analysis of the effect
of the financing of public investment and the prepara-
tion of a more specific model for the expectations of
private agents. The subject is of considerable impor-
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